A Malta Air Boeing 737-800 operating a Ryanair service from Pisa to Glasgow Prestwick landed at Manchester Airport with just 363kg of fuel remaining after being caught in severe weather during Storm Amy, with three separate windshear encounters, multiple go-arounds and an initial refusal of its diversion request contributing to a serious incident investigated by the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB).
The aircraft, registered 9H-QBD, was carrying 171 passengers and six crew when the incident occurred on 3 October 2025. No one was injured and the aircraft was not damaged, but the investigation has highlighted the rapidly changing circumstances that can turn a well-planned flight into a fuel-critical situation.
The crew had been aware of the weather associated with Storm Amy before leaving Italy and had taken additional fuel as a precaution. A total of 11,500kg was planned for the flight, including 1,937kg of discretionary fuel, providing approximately 72 minutes of additional flying time.
Manchester had been selected as the preferred alternate because its forecast weather was significantly better than that expected at Prestwick and Glasgow. However, the crew faced difficult conditions almost as soon as they began their approach to Prestwick.
The aircraft was cleared to approach Runway 20, with winds reported at 240° at 29kt, gusting to 45kt. As it descended, the crew encountered increasingly turbulent conditions and disconnected the autopilot and autothrottle. At around 264ft above the airfield, the aircraft’s Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) generated a windshear warning.
The pilots immediately carried out the Boeing 737 windshear escape manoeuvre, applying maximum thrust and pitching the aircraft to maximise its climb performance. Once clear of the windshear, they continued with a normal go-around and entered a hold at 6,000ft.
The aircraft still had around 4,608kg of fuel at this point, and the crew decided to wait and assess the situation. Another Boeing 737 subsequently attempted the approach and reported losing around 25kt of airspeed on short final, but managed to land.
The 9H-QBD crew therefore decided to make another attempt.
Conditions appeared somewhat better during the second approach, but at approximately 50ft above the runway the aircraft again received a windshear warning. The crew carried out another escape manoeuvre and went around for the second time.
Fuel had now fallen to approximately 3,515kg.
Before making the second approach, the crew had told air traffic control that if they had to go around again they intended to divert to Manchester. However, following the second windshear encounter, the crew were told that Manchester could not accept the diversion.
This became one of the most significant aspects of the AAIB investigation.
The aircraft’s crew had identified Manchester as their preferred alternate before departure and considered its weather suitable for the diversion. Manchester’s published diversion policy also stated that diversions should be accepted where sufficient capacity existed. Despite this, the crew were told that the airport could not accept their aircraft, apparently following communication between Manchester’s Airfield Control and the aircraft’s handling agent.
The AAIB could not establish exactly how the refusal occurred because there was no recording of the communications between Airfield Control and the handling agent. However, the investigation found that Manchester had subsequently reviewed the circumstances and reiterated that decisions on accepting diversions should be made by Airfield Operations, rather than by the handling agent.
At the time, the airport had accepted 19 other diversions during Storm Amy.
With Manchester apparently unavailable, the crew considered their alternatives. Glasgow was experiencing similar weather to Prestwick, while Edinburgh was reporting strong winds but no current windshear reports. The crew requested a diversion to Edinburgh and, after approximately five minutes, the diversion was accepted.
The aircraft then headed towards Edinburgh.
By this stage, the crew were becoming increasingly concerned about their fuel state and the possibility of another failed approach. Their concerns were justified.
During the approach to Edinburgh, winds were reported at 240° at 34kt, gusting to 46kt. The crew asked whether other aircraft had experienced windshear but were told there had been no such reports at that time.
At approximately 745ft above the airfield, the 737 received another windshear warning.
It was the third windshear encounter of the flight.
Once again, the crew performed the windshear escape manoeuvre and went around. Fuel had now fallen to approximately 2,164kg.
The pilots were now faced with a difficult decision. They were concerned that attempting another approach at Edinburgh could result in yet another windshear encounter, while their fuel reserves were continuing to fall rapidly. The operator’s procedures also prohibited a third approach following two approaches abandoned because of windshear.
Manchester was reconsidered as the safest option.
The problem was that the aircraft could no longer reach Manchester while retaining the operator’s required final reserve fuel.
Initially, the crew estimated that they would arrive at Manchester with between 500kg and 700kg of fuel. When Manchester was entered into the aircraft’s flight management computer, however, the predicted landing fuel fell to around 300kg.
The operator’s required final reserve was 1,101kg.
The commander declared a MAYDAY due to fuel at 1912 UTC and told air traffic control that the crew were concerned about encountering further windshear at Edinburgh. The aircraft was then cleared towards Manchester.
The journey to Manchester was now being made with a progressively reducing fuel margin. Low-fuel quantity alerts illuminated during the flight, with the recorded fuel quantities at one point showing only 523kg in the right tank and 404kg in the left.
The crew carried out the appropriate fuel-balancing procedure while continuing towards Manchester.
The AAIB found that the engines had consumed fuel particularly rapidly during the earlier windshear escape manoeuvres, when they had been operating at go-around power. With three such events during the flight, along with holding and diversion flying, the additional fuel loaded at Pisa had been progressively eroded.
The aircraft eventually landed safely on Manchester’s Runway 23R at approximately 1952 UTC.
The recorded fuel remaining at touchdown was just 363kg.
That was 738kg below the operator’s required final reserve.
By the time the engines were shut down, the recorded fuel quantity had fallen to approximately 240kg.
Despite the seriousness of the situation, the AAIB found no fault with the aircraft’s windshear detection system. The EGPWS had recorded all three windshear events and the system manufacturer confirmed that it had operated correctly.
The investigation instead identified a combination of factors behind the incident.
The severe weather associated with Storm Amy was the initial trigger, with the aircraft encountering windshear at Prestwick and subsequently at Edinburgh. The crew had taken additional fuel specifically because of the forecast conditions, but the repeated go-arounds and diversion requirements consumed that margin much faster than anticipated.
The handling of the Manchester diversion also played an important part. Had Manchester accepted the aircraft after the second failed approach at Prestwick, the subsequent diversion to Edinburgh and the third windshear encounter would not have occurred.
The AAIB also examined the crew’s decision-making as the situation developed. Once the aircraft had committed to Manchester, other options, including returning to Edinburgh or diverting to a closer airport such as Newcastle, were not pursued. By the time the low-fuel alerts appeared, Edinburgh was behind the aircraft but geographically closer than Manchester.
The investigation does not attribute the incident to a single error or decision. Instead, it demonstrates how several relatively manageable problems can combine rapidly when an aircraft is operating in severe weather.
The crew had departed Pisa with substantial additional fuel and had selected an alternate with better forecast weather. However, three windshear encounters, three escape manoeuvres, holding, diversion delays and the initial difficulty securing a diversion to Manchester progressively reduced the available fuel.
The AAIB noted that the final reserve is intended to provide protection when unforeseen circumstances prevent a flight from being completed as originally planned. In this case, the sequence of events ultimately resulted in the aircraft landing with considerably less than that reserve.
The investigation also resulted in a change at Manchester Airport. Following the incident, the airport reviewed its diversion arrangements and reiterated that Airfield Operations is responsible for deciding whether an inbound diversion can be accepted where capacity exists, rather than leaving that decision with a handling agent.
For the 171 passengers and six crew on board, the flight ended safely at Manchester. For the aviation industry, however, the incident provides a clear illustration of how quickly fuel margins can disappear when severe weather results in repeated approaches and go-arounds, and how important effective coordination between flight crews, air traffic control, airports and ground-handling organisations becomes when an aircraft needs to divert.
The AAIB report was published on 24 September 2026 and classified the event as a serious incident.
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