An Airbus A300-600F freighter sustained significant structural damage after striking its tail on the runway during a landing at London Heathrow Airport, prompting the crew to initiate a go-around before subsequently landing safely on a second approach.
The incident, involving Airbus A300-622F registered D-AEAG, occurred on 12 October 2025 while the aircraft was operating a cargo flight from Leipzig-Schkeuditz Airport in Germany to Heathrow. The findings have been published in the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) Bulletin 11/2026.
The aircraft, which was carrying two crew members and no passengers, was approaching Runway 09L when it experienced a bounce during touchdown. The subsequent sequence of events resulted in the aircraft’s rear fuselage striking the runway, causing damage to its underside and internal structure.
According to the AAIB report, the approach had been stable, with the aircraft fully configured for landing and meeting the required approach criteria. The commander was flying manually after disconnecting the autopilot and autothrust during the final stages of the approach.
The flare began at approximately 30ft, with the aircraft’s pitch stabilising at around 5.5 degrees nose-up. The left main landing gear made contact with the runway first, followed by the right landing gear, before the aircraft briefly bounced.
As the aircraft settled back onto the runway, the ground spoilers began deploying and the commander selected reverse thrust. During the subsequent touchdown sequence, the aircraft initially pitched down before the commander applied back-pressure to the control column to prevent the nosewheel from striking the runway heavily.
However, the combination of the additional nose-up control input and the aerodynamic effect of the deploying ground spoilers caused the aircraft’s pitch attitude to increase rapidly.
Flight data recorded a maximum pitch attitude of 12.3 degrees nose-up, resulting in the tailstrike. The AAIB identified the commanded increase in pitch, compounded by the pitch-up effect associated with ground spoiler deployment, as the principal factors in the event.
The commander called for a go-around approximately three seconds after the initial touchdown, believing the aircraft may have experienced a high bounce and become unstable. However, the investigation found that reverse thrust had already been selected, something the commander had not consciously registered at the time.
The Airbus A300’s operating procedures require a full-stop landing once reverse thrust has been selected. Consequently, initiating a go-around after the thrust reversers had begun deploying was contrary to the manufacturer’s and operator’s procedures.
When the commander advanced the throttles to go-around power, engine thrust remained limited until the thrust reverser translating sleeves had returned to their fully stowed position and the system had latched. This delayed the engines’ response, with the aircraft’s airspeed reducing to approximately 107 knots before engine speed began increasing.
The aircraft subsequently lifted off at around 110 knots, although it did not establish a positive rate of climb for a further eight seconds. The crew continued the go-around and received radar vectors from air traffic control for a second approach, landing on Runway 09R.
During the climb, the crew also received an indication that the No. 1 engine thrust reverser remained unlocked. Flight data showed the indication persisted until approximately 1,200ft above aerodrome level. The investigation was unable to establish why the system continued to register as unlocked after the reverser had returned to its closed position. Video footage and recorded flight data confirmed that the reversers had closed and did not subsequently reopen during the go-around.
Following the landing, the aircraft was grounded at Heathrow for several months while its damage was assessed. Engineers identified significant damage to the lower rear fuselage, including buckling of the skin around frame 77, separation of rivets connecting the skin to the internal structure and abrasion damage to the aircraft’s tailskid.
A more detailed structural examination identified severe damage, including deformation of an internal bulkhead frame and shearing of the cleats connecting it to the fuselage skin. The operator subsequently sought assistance from Airbus to assess the possibility of a repair, but the aircraft was ultimately retired from service.
D-AEAG was manufactured in 1992 and originally delivered as a passenger aircraft before being converted into a freighter in 2011. It had operated with its current operator since the conversion.
The AAIB’s analysis highlighted the challenges faced by flight crews when responding to a bouncing landing, particularly the need to distinguish between a light bounce and a high bounce. Although both the operator and manufacturer provided separate recovery procedures, the report noted that there were no predefined parameters to help pilots recognise which type of bounce was occurring.
In this instance, the manufacturer considered the bounce to have been a light bounce. The commander, however, believed the aircraft was entering a high-bounce situation and initiated the go-around accordingly.
The investigation also highlighted the potential for ground spoiler deployment to produce a pitch-up effect, a characteristic already recognised in the aircraft’s operating documentation. Both the manufacturer’s and operator’s manuals warn pilots to be prepared to counteract this effect during landing.
The AAIB noted that only four seconds elapsed between the initial contact of the left main landing gear with the runway and the commander advancing the throttles for the go-around, illustrating the limited time available to assess and respond to the rapidly developing situation.
Weather conditions were not considered a significant contributing factor. Recorded data indicated relatively calm conditions, with light winds and a modest crosswind component. The aircraft’s centre of gravity was also within the permitted operating limits.
The AAIB concluded that the tailstrike resulted from the commanded increase in pitch following touchdown, exacerbated by the associated pitch-up effect of ground spoiler deployment. Although reverse thrust had already been selected before the go-around was initiated, the investigation did not consider this to have directly contributed to the tailstrike itself.
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